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MYTHS ABOUT Ti-IF PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT
1) Planning mythology
*A French economist on trial in Madagascar earlier this
year alleged that the country's elan largely existed in
"folk songs". Albert Waterston- here recounts some
of the hardier traditions in planning folklore.
A widely held myth is that planning is limited to plan
formulation and that plan implementation is something else. This
convenient myth (convenient, that is, for planners whose job is
plan formulation) makes it possible for planners to work in the
aseptic atmosphere of a central planning agency, located in the
capital of a poor country (away from the grime, and inconvenience
of the back country). Plan implementation is politica1
administrative and social, hence, a bit messy and irrational (unlike
plan formulation which is essentially clean-cut economics). Since
this myth has often led to the production of plans which have
never had much chance of being carried out, it might not be a bad
idea to consider the possibility of including implementation as an
integral part of planning. If planners had to spell out in detail
what had to be done to achieve the targets in their plans, exactly
how it was to be done, and by whom, it is hard to believe that they
would Continue to delude themselves that their targets are realistic.
A corollary myth to the first one is that plans are prepared
by planners and implemented by non-planners. This leads to a
commonly encountered syndrome, the "we -- they" phenomenon for
effect. (If one is in a central planning agency "we" are the
planners and "they" are the rest of the government with the private
sector something thrown in for good measure. If one is outside the
central planning office, "we" are the government and/or the private
sector and "they" are the planners). Since macro planning without
micro planning is a head without a body, it might be worth consider-
ing whether effective planning does not require that everyone become
a planner. It makes a difference whether one is a macro or a micro
planner, but this is where the difference ends. A final thought:
it is becoming increasingly clear that development is largely micro.
There is a well-entrenched myth that all self-respecting
countries, big and small, rich and poor, in good times or bad, should
plan only one way: that is, with perspective, medium-term and
annual plans. Moreover, the medium-term plan had best be a five
year plan (one wonders why five years is better than any other),
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which must adjust in essentials to the it of too1s rat1er than
the other way around. it is just possible that "the other way
around" may be the better approach. At least, it should be
considered. In that case, planning might begin with an examination
of the actual conditions in each economy and require the careful
selection of only those tools which meet the needs of that economy.
A myth which may seem to contradict the last conlusion (but
does not) holds that since each country is unique, it has little
to learn from the planning experience of other countries, Of
course, every country is unique, but the record shows that they
all seem to have the same kind of planning problems and that
they thake similar mistakes in attempting to deal with them. Hence,
it may be possible that a countrys despite its indisputable unique-
ness, could learn a great deal from the experience of other
countries. But this does not mean that a country can indiscrim-
inately adopc without change the planning system of another
country. Poor ccuntrîes which have attempted to adopt without
much modification the French planning model, provide edifying
examples of the errors of this procedure.
*One theme in planning folklore is the assumption, usualiy
tacit, that projects which may not themselves individual]y
contribute to development can nevertheless by interaction
promote the conditions for it. Hence the myth that "if a
sufficient number of separate uneconomic development projects
are connected together they constitute a worthwhile develop-
ment prograne". Professor Youngson writes:
This view, which is of course never explicitly stated but
which is implicit in a good deal of 'planning' over the last
twenty years, is a simpiifitátionáncLbowdlérisâtion_of Rosenstein-
Rodans striking and influential article in the Economic Journal
in 1943. In that article, Rosenstein-Rodan pointed out that
where a single project might not succeed for lack of a market,
several projects simultaneously undertaken might provide markets
for one another and thus producethe conditions necessary for
the success of all of them and a basis for further development.
The argument, although it leaves a great deal unsaid about the
role of foreign trade, is formally correct provided one assumes
that one or another of some rather complicated sets of highly
specific assumptions concerning product variation, the rate
of growth of the market, the pattern of time preference, the degree
of increasing return and so on are, in fact, met.
Nothing is easier than to think up development projects which
will make a loss. This can sometimes be converted into a profit
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by the imposition of a suitable tariff which will choke off
eu.ernal sources of supply. Alternatively, the risk o not being
able to sell the final product can be reduced by building up
dcmand, and this can be done by linking the project in question
with some other loss-making project in a demand-súpply relation-
ship. A network of such projects can then be established, and
appeals to past experience dismissed on the ground that such
experience is irrelevant where the whole structure of an economy
is to be changed. The "planner's" case is strengthened if he
can - and he usually does - claim that important economies of
scale, not currently available, will be realised. The critic
has now to consider, not one, but a whole series of projects
operating in an economic situation not currently observable,
concerning which all sorts of assumptions, notably about demand,
enterprise and resource availability have to be made. The
more this situation is unlike the present one (i.e., the rosier
the planner's views about the future), the more any discussion
about its realisation becomes a matter of opinion and tiot of
estimation. Founded on solid if not very far-reaching economic
analysis, there is a structure of dreams.
It would be fair to describe an economy 'planned' in this
way as a ramshackle empire of unprofitable enterprises. True,
there may be some advantages in such 'development'. Employment
is created at all levels from the Plan Office down, and it
is likely that output has been raised. But complacency about
the achievement depends on several questions being satisfactorily
answered. The capital used - would it have been made available
for other purposes? The resources committed - could they have
been used to buy goods more cheaply in foreign markets? The
matching of demand and supply - has it been efficient as
between enterprises and has it resulted in consumers getting
what they watt? Is foreign indebtedness greater? If it is,
can interest payments be met? And if they cannot, what are
reactions going to be, at home and abroad, in the next round
of development?
2) Myths of the rural sector
*Planners have their assumptions about how resources
can be increased and how they should be treated. There
is an especially influential assumption to the effect
that development is about the transfer of agricultural
surpluses from the rural sector to the urban sector.
Michael Lipton1) questions this view and some of its
implications.
Reader in Economics, University of Sussex, and Fellow
of the Institute of Development Studies.
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It is a myth that development can be achieved cheaply,
easily and painlessly by a rapid transfer of resources from
agricultural to non-agricultural activities. The protagonists
of this myth usually have three surpluses in mind. Labour is
to move from village to town as fast as possible; "the marginal
product of farm labour is zero" so no farm output, allegedly,
is lost, while the big supply of indusrial workers ensures
low-wage, high-profit and therefore high-investment production.
The surplus of food sold to towns is to grow as fast as possible;
cheap, ample food will ensure that urban workers are well-fed
and docile, even with low money wages. Finally, the share
of capital enjoyed by indûstrial activities is to be increased
by a transfer of rural savings to support urban investment.
In practice, all three things have happened throughout
the less developed world. They are supported by powerful
political pressures. The farmers, often illiterate, every-
where dispersed, have fewer voices than votes. It is urban
riots, urban businessmen that bring governments down. But the
notion that maximum surplus transfer helps development, growth
or welfare is a self-indulgent myth Qf those economists who
are urbanists first, analysts a poor second, and empiricists
not at all.
The transfer of surplus labour is least indefensible.
In many places, the extra output produced by a worker is
much more in the factory than on the farm (though it is never
"zero" on the farm). But this is not true for the unskilled,
illiterate rural masses, accustomed to the slack labour discipline
of rain and sun - such men are no use in industry. To be
effective, such movement requires in most cases multi-shift
factory working, since single-shift working is seldom carried
on in factories short of labour. Further, in view of seasonal
peaks in agriculture, together with the need of efficient
industries for a year-round committedTwork-force, rapid
labour transfer requires a massive compaign to disperse
industry from big cities to small country towns near the
migrants' villages. Lastly, there are social costs: the
selective migration of male workers to towns involves severe
urban sex imbalance (often 3 men for every 2 women in
marriageable age-groups) and a rural sector deprived both
of workers and of dynamic leadership.
As for food, nobody denies that rural food should be
swapped for urban fertiliser and soap. But to maximise the
rate of rural-to-urban food marketing is merely to damage the
farmer's terms of trade (and, hence his ability to save and his
will to invest in farming). It involves pushing food towards
those who are least hungry and thus the least likely to
work harder or longer for being better fed - the urban employed.
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In so doing, this process biases the whole structure of food
output (and agrnomic research) towards high-cost luxury foods
for the rich: milled rice, not millets; milk, not pulses.
Furthermore, it is big farmers who market big surpluses, but
the small farmers who get most food per acre, or per unit
of capital.
Capital presumably should go where it yields most.
In poor countries, new agricultural investment typically
produces l to 2 times as much as new industrial investment.
Yet few Plans allocate as much as 25 per cent of investment
to agriculture - where 70 per cent of workers produce 50
per cent of output, largely because they are short of
capital: Admittedly, the yields of industrial investment are
more likely to be saved, but again at low returns; rural
consumption of the food produced by agricultural investment
raises productivity next harvest. Anyway, at the same income
level farmers save more than townsmen.
The Doctrine of Surpluses is not even consistent.
If the government goes for a particular rate of transfers
of food and labour, the incentives to private saving and
investment in village and town are determined thereby. The
doctrine may be the path of short-run political convenience;
it is neither developmentally efficient nor intellectually
respectable.
*But how is production of food and other agricultural
resources to be increased? One of the most important
problems here is water-supply, and irrigation schemes
are often adopted in the hope of1olving the problem.
Dr. M. D. Gwynne and Mr. M. Dagg expose some of the
technical difficulties involved in the use of irrigation.
Irrigation is often hailed as the answer to the problem
of limited available water for crop production - and so
it is in competent hands. Assuming, however, an adequate
1)Both of the East African Agriculture and Forestry Research
Organization, Nairobi. For reasons of space we have had
to abridge this discussion of water-supply problems in
developing countries. An article by Dr. Gwynne and Mr. Dagg
on the use of boreholes and the relationship of forest
cover to water resources will appear in the fifth issue
of the Bulletin.
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supply of water for irrigation, and this is not usually
the case in dry countries, the problems attendant on
irrigation practice are many.
Irrigation is a difficult form of agriculture that
requires tight discipline to ensure that the careful balance
between all the various biological and environmental
factors involved is maintained. Without such control
economic loss can be considerable and, what is worse, the
areas may be made completely unfit for any form of
agriculture.
Pilot irrigation schemes in the tropics are usually
run by expert agronomists from elsewhere and they can give
reasonable crop yields. The planners, however, have the
difficult task of estimating what fraction of the potential
production could actually be achieved by the local popula-
tion. Most schemes are sited in pastoral areas where the
people have little or no tradition of settled agriculture
and therefore have a different set of values, and are
used to a more casual watering practice. They are, there-
fore unable to appreciate the great care and constant
attention that is necessary to ensure the success of the
scheme - the age-old clash between the interests of the
pastoralists and the agriculturalists may even make them
actively antagonistic to the idea. This latter view
will also ensure that they will be unlikely to tolerate
agricultural peoples on their land to participate in
the scheme.
Irrigation in dry areas brings with it salinity prob-
lems which if allowed to get out of control can cause
the ruination of the scheme by making the area poisonous
to all plants. If the amount of water lost from the soil
by evaporation greatly exceeds the amount of water
applied to the soil, either by rain or by irrigation, the
soil salts which dissolve in the soil water are brought
to the upper soil layers where they accumulate forming
a toxic region. The balance between water loss and
rate of water application, therefore, has to be carefully
watched and constantly adjusted to ensure that this
does not happen.
With the exception of the Nile Valley, all bcthe
irrigation schemes of the ancient world failed due to
salt accumulation in the soil. The Nile system was able
to continue because every year the ground was covered
by the floods which brought sufficient water to leach the
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salts from the soil, thus ensuring that they never
accumulated in quantities sufficient to poison the
crops. Without adequate firm control the dangers of
salinity poisoning occurring on a modern irrigation scheme
are equally great.
*Where such technical difficulties abound, there is
a temptation to ask "Science" to cut the knot. But,
despite claims for'pröcesses which will resolve the
food problem dramatically, "Sciece" has been oddly
ineffective. Jonathan Seagrave' examines "the
mth of manna from science".
The pathetic, pot-bellied subjects of Oxf am advertise-
ments move not only the hearts of the generous but the
imagination of scientists. The resuilt of the publicity
given to the 'protein problem' has been the blossoming
of a multitude of exotic techniques for producing edible
protein - protein from oil, from gas, from fresh leaves,
from wool, high protein maize, ynthetic lysine, and so
on. As readers of the 'pop' scientific journals like
New Scientisttwill know, the inventors are nothing ii not
precipitate in making startling claims for these processes.
Hardly a week goes by without another "world-saving"
process being announced.
Despite the energy and ingenuity spent in this way, the
problem remains virtually untouched. The only gains that
can be shown are a few thousand tons of 'Incap' type
compound foods, sold to the well-off and well-fed, and
(probably more useful) the fortification of American
surplus flour with vitamins.
Why is this so? Basically, the reason is simple. The
nutrition problem in the developing countries is primarily
one of low incomes, lack of demand, not of supply. Scientists
naively assume that because children are ill fed, an
increase in the supply of protein foodstuffs will improve
their lot. They seem totally unaware that the developing
countries produce and export millions of tons of protein,
oilseed cake and fishme1:, to fatten the cattle of Europe.
The protein is already there: but only if processed and
distributed free, or at giveaway prices, will it enter the
right stomachs.
Research Assistant, Institute of Development Studies.
1)
Unilever Ltd., London
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The situation is indeed worse than this. Theie is every
prospect that the most successful exotic process to date,
British Petroleum's 'protein-from-oil' will, in time, lead
to the unrequited loss of large and growing export markets
for the developing countries. The inventions will be seen
as harmful, not helpful, to the poor.
This is a sorry state of affairs, but not surprising.
The economist has failed in his job. For his role, in
defining and publicizing technical solutions worth seeking
is logically prior, if in no sense superior to, that of the
technologist in producing them. This has not been adequately
done. Thus the 'protein problem' has been mis-specified: it
is not an engineering problem of production, but an economic
problem of distribution, and above all, a political problem
of action.
3. The mythology of trade and aid
*If the resources are there, what are the assumptions
about their use which may lead to wastage? Various
pieces of conventional wisdom now seem rather suspect
in this connection. For instance, there is the notion
that "underdeveloped countries should always process
their exports of raw materials as much as possible"
But take the case of gold-refining in a country like,
say, Ghana. The costs in foreign exchange of spare
parts and replacements and the costs of employing
expatriate technicians would be higher than the added
value of the gold.
Then there is the question of the status of Private1)
investment in developing countries. Maurice Zinkin
asks whether the interests of investors need bear
any relation to the demands of host governments
There is a general belief, repeated very recently in the
Stikker Report, that if an investor from a more developed
country invests in a less developed country he ought to take
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special account of the needs and feelings of the country
in which he has invested,.
At first sight, this is an uneKceptionable doctrine.
Obviously, everything will go more smoothly if one can employ
in senior positions the nationals of the countries in which
one invests, if one can increase its exports, and if one
observes the prejudices of its politicians and its electorate.
If one does not thus consider the feelings of one's host, he
is liable at some stage to react violently, with disastrous
effects on one's profits.
What is normally not said is that this consideration
has to be paid for, and that some of the prejudices of host
countries are very expensive.
Nobody employs an expatriate when a local will do;
expatriates are more expensive. Nobody refuses to export
if exporting is profitable. Nobody competes in a way the
locals find too aggressive unless it enables him to expand
his market. In short, nobody does anything which may
cause offence unless in some way or other it enables his
business to operate more efficiently and more profitably.
This means that if a business changes the policy it
would otherwise have in order to meet local feelings, it.
must of necessity operate less efficiently and less profitably.
If one employs local managers who are appreciably less
capable than expatriates, or if one exports at a loss, the
business suffers. Since no private investor with a sense
of duty to his shareholders will invest in another country
at a lower rate of return than he would get in his own, this
means that the total amount of investment will be reduced.
Many projects which, if there were no local feelings, would
be profitable, become unprofitable. This is particularly
true if the local feelings include a determination to
attain a socialist society. The investor has to allow
for the fact that this determination is liable in due
course to be very expensive for him.
Those who argue that the investor should show a
consideration for the feelings of his host country and
electorate which goes beyond the requirements of the law are
giving the investor very good advice. They are also
ensuring that the developing countriés will get less invest-
ment than they otherwise would have done; and this is
true whether the developing country concerned is the UK
or Canáda, India or Brazil.
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*We may, of course, not care abo tire feelings of
investors. But how far does that other external
resource, technical assistance, actually contribute to
development? What ae the conditions for it doing so?
Lord Ritchie-Calder1 identifies a psychological myth
which has damaged the work of technical assistance:
One of the persistent myths of development is that
"we" know what is good for "them". We may know what they
need - more food, better health, better water supplies, etc. -
but it is more useful to find out what they want. The
worst mistakes in technical assistance over the last twenty
years have been due to failure to achieve this simple
understanding. What may have been intended might have been
entirely praiseworthy but was bound to fail by lack of
cooperation: then we call it 'ingratitude'. Successful
projects have been based on "felt need", i.e. what people
want - "dirty hands" and "self-help". The "dirty hands"
are important because it means not just telling people what
to do but getting involved with them. "Self-help"means
leaving them with the sense that they have done it themselves,
and therefore it is their project and will be maintained as
such. The lesson of all technical assistance is that it
cannot do things for people and expect permanent results
-
you have to do it with people.
*Technical assistance also has political and economic
failings. It may breed pacts of self-interest between
donor and recipient, it may be worse than useless when
technical skill exceeds social insight. Under the rueful
heading, Some of My Best Experts are Friends,
Paul Streeten considers the limits of friendship:
Technical assistance is commonly regarded as a
particularly valuable form of aid. It often receives top
priority in aid programmes. It can, however, have serious
defects. First, we do not use an independent measure of its
value. Its output is measured in terms of its input
- money
spent or number of experts sent out. This measure conveys
a deceptive impression of achievement, when nothing may in
fact have been achieved. The index is self-inflating.
Enjoyment is often mistaken for success.
Montague Burton Professor of International Relations,
University of Edinburgh.
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L-L) cave a vested 'Lnteres&: in irL .:ing technical
i-s .ance. ugrammes. wi out scruciniing tneir va..ue. For
iaving an inpact on ueve;opment might mean showing. up domestic
shortcomings, hurting interests in the aIded countries,
annoying people and upsetting things. The foreign expers,
as long as he has no impact, adds prestige to the hot country
without being troublesome.
Thirdly, experts can live in lutury unattainable at home.
They too, unless exceptionally selfcritical, have no interest.
to probe too deeply into the quest:Ion whether their existence
is justified. But by their expie, employing servants,
dressing and eating differe.nt)y ad keeping their own company,
they reinforce the difficulties created for development by
a dual economy. The harmony of ioeerets betweon recipient
government, donor agency and expe . in preventing !:aTrJal
reforms means that many utruited acople of medlcr uo1.itv
are attracted and hired Oxfami.iiariz.; do not eo
contempt: ît breeds mucuai adrsirr -.Joo.
Fourthly, the ahsorptive canacityU of underdeveloped
countries is limited not only for capital, but also for
technical assistance. To teach su Ils effectively, mnch
more is needed than teaching, Humar atritude.s and soia1,
institutions in a complex socia vstem may bave to h changed
if the teaching is to have an imp:t Without reJ.ormc in
other parts of the syste. the asst:ance does tiot t:ae,
The Cut. flowers wither and.dic herause they have iO roots,
Fifthly the specialised Uni ted Nations encte cave,
as a result of their constitutions and their attempts to
preserve and enlarge their frontiers, a technocratic bias
which tends to emphasise technical solutions" without
regard to the cultural and social system.
Sixthly, the lack of Uabsorptive eapacity is matched
by a lack of Tdisgorging capacity on the part of donors.
Experts often do not know the local language nor the physal
and cultural environment; their equipment is illadapted to
local needs, headquarter briefings are poor and debriefings
absent, and operations are not flexible enough to follow up
desirable new developments and to eliminate ndsirable ones.
lt only remains to say that all this applies with even
greater force to many of those who set out to crititise, asses
and "evaluate" the work of others. lt may or may not be true
to say that those who can, do; it almost certainly is true
that those who can't, evaluate.
